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I. INTRODUCTION
TANDARD economic theories predict winners and losers from ec-
onomic integration and assume that support for integration will de-
velop along the lines of economic interests. These theories do not
consider that the persuasive effects of targeted information can also
shape attitudes. This paper examines public opinion over the case of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in order to address
the three major questions. First, how well do standard economic theories
predict opinions toward NAFTA in each of the three countries? Second,
how did the rhetorical debate over NAFTA shape opinions in each case?
And, finally, are rhetoric and cues capable of trumping economic inter-
ests, that is, persuading individuals to adopt policy stances that conflict
with their objective economic situation? We find that non-economic in-
terests can have a substantial influence on opinions toward NAFTA, even
to the point of canceling out the effects of economic interests, and that
the significance of these factors is driven by the country-specific nature of
the information context.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was officially
implemented on January 1, 1994. After more than ten years of experi-
ence with the agreement, scholars, politicians, and publics continue to
speculate about the extent to which the integration of North America will
mirror the European Project. As the experience of the European Union
has shown, regional integration is a dynamic process. While NAFTA's
initial purpose was to open economic markets for goods and services, a
more cooperative relationship between these three countries has devel-
oped, and there have been efforts to deepen and widen the scope of re-
gional integration. One example of this has been the dialogue initiated
by Vicente Fox with the United States to liberalize labor markets in addi-
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tion to trade. While labor market integration and political integration are
goals that may never be realized, NAFTA could lead to a closer political
and economic relationship between the countries of North America.
The scope of future integration, and indeed the maintenance of the cur-
rent level of integration, depends, in part, on the level of public support
for such a project in the three democratic Member States. This paper
looks at the sources of public support for North American integration in
Mexico, Canada, and the United States and discusses the implications of
these sources for the future of North American integration. Specifically,
we argue that attitudes toward NAFTA are shaped by the distribution of
economic gains and losses from the agreement, but that political rhetoric
and cues are capable of trumping economic interests and persuading indi-
viduals to adopt policy stances that conflict with their objective economic
situation.
This paper begins by developing economic and political context models
of public opinion toward NAFTA in Canada, Mexico, and the United
States. We then test these models and discuss the implications of our
findings for public support toward integration in North America.
II. ECONOMIC THEORIES AND PUBLIC OPINION
Standard economic theories predict winners and losers from economic
integration and assume that support for and opposition to these policies
will develop along the lines of economic interests. Trade theories provide
several predictions about what effects economic liberalization should
have on the members of different countries. In particular, they identify
which groups are likely to experience dislocations and insecurities. In the
past, several works by the authors tested some of the hypotheses sug-
gested by these theories with respect to individual-level public opinion
over liberalization and welfare state expansion (Aldrich et al. 1999a,
1999b; Kramer, Stephenson and Lange 2000; Aldrich, Merolla, Stephen-
son and Zechmeister 2001; Merolla and Stephenson 2001). The general
finding from these studies is that individuals' objective and subjective ec-
onomic insecurities, measured in a variety of ways, are clearly linked to
their preferences over government provision of social welfare, but less so
to their preferences over general trade liberalization. In this section, we
describe the basic economic hypotheses that we test in this paper con-
cerning possible determinants of public opinion about NAFTA in Ca-
nada, Mexico, and the United States.
NAFTA was designed to lower barriers to trade in Mexico, the United
States, and Canada. The anticipated effect of the agreement was and is
that all countries involved benefit from the increased exchange of goods.
New markets for goods may result in increased industry as well as im-
proved access to cheaper goods and services. While the net economic
impact of NAFTA to all countries may be positive, models of interna-
tional trade predict that while certain segments of the economy in each
country will benefit from the agreement, others will lose.
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Several models of international trade identify winners and losers within
different segments of society. The Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H-O-S)
model of trade focuses on factors of production, typically land, labor, and
capital (Atkinson 1982). Based on assumptions about factor mobility and
protective barriers to trade, the H-O-S model deduces that scarce factors,
relative to trading partners, will suffer declining demand if trade barriers
are reduced. In contrast, abundant factors, relative to trading partners,
will benefit from trade liberalization. For example, skilled labor is rela-
tively abundant in Canada and the United States compared to Mexico,
and vice versa. Thus, the economies of Canada and the United States
have a comparative advantage in the supply of highly-skilled labor. How-
ever, those with fewer skills in these countries will be disadvantaged. Un-
skilled and semi-skilled workers in the United States and Canada will see
a decline in demand for their services, since goods that they once pro-
duced are likely to be imported from Mexico. In contrast, low-skilled
labor in Mexico should benefit by attracting industries focused on labor-
intensive production, while more highly-skilled individuals will find them-
selves facing increased competition. Thus, the H-O-S model gives us the
following hypothesis:
HI: Low-skilled workers in the United States and Canada should op-
pose NAFTA while high-skilled workers should support it. In con-
trast, high-skilled workers in Mexico should oppose NAFTA, while
low-skilled workers should support it.
An alternative trade theory, Ricardo-Viner (R-V), focuses on sectoral
effects rather than factors. Sectors are economic groupings that contain
similar or closely related industries such as the information technology
sector, agricultural sector, and the finance sector. A sector may be ad-
vantaged or disadvantaged because of the type and abundance of re-
sources available, including land, technology, and labor. The R-V model
predicts that all individuals within a certain sector will experience the
same positive or negative effects, regardless of skill level. This argument
is based on the assumption that there are costs in redeploying resources
that prevent individuals from freely shifting across sectors and taking ad-
vantage of market changes.1 NAFTA is believed to have had harmful
effects on a variety of sectors across North America. For example, in the
United States, the textile and automobile industries faced serious compe-
tition from Mexico. In all three countries, farmers were faced with a
range of adjustment costs. The Ricardo-Viner model provides us with our
second hypothesis:
H2: Sectors harmed by NAFTA should oppose the agreement. Sup-
port for NAFTA should come from sectors that benefit.
1. Iversen and Cusack (2000) find that changes to sectoral components of an econ-
omy best explain trends toward welfare state expansion. In other words, disloca-
tions and insecurities were felt most strongly by individuals within certain sectors.
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A third model, the human capital model, anticipates that individuals
with high skill levels are better able to adjust to changing economic cir-
cumstances, such as those brought about by new trade policies, because
their skills allow them to move from one job to another (Becker 1993).
As a result, this segment of the population will benefit from the trade
liberalizing policies of NAFTA because they are in a position to take ad-
vantage of new opportunities. Highly skilled workers, in general, are also
more secure in their jobs because their marginal productivity is greater
than that of unskilled workers. This model contrasts somewhat with the
H-O-S model, at least for developing countries, because it argues that
more highly skilled individuals in these countries, even though they are
less abundant, should welcome free trade. In contrast, in anticipation of
adjustment costs they might not be able to meet, low-skilled workers in
all three countries should oppose liberalization. Consequently, our third
economic hypothesis is the following:
H3: In all three countries, low-skilled workers should oppose NAFTA,
while high-skilled workers should support it.
Our final economic hypothesis is drawn from all of these theories and
from work by political economists on the subject of globalization. This
hypothesis states that subjective, as well as objective, economic insecurity
matters. We argue that in advanced industrial countries, economic inse-
curity should be negatively associated with preferences for free trade. In
the case of NAFTA, while the United States and Canada were clearly
concerned about losing jobs, Mexico stood to gain jobs with the move-
ment of labor-intensive industries south of the U.S. border and with the
incursion of foreign-owned mega-stores in urban areas. Thus, our hy-
pothesis for Mexico, and for any developing country in a similar situation,
is that economically insecure individuals should favor NAFTA. The pros-
pect for gains under NAFTA should convince most of these individuals to
support the agreement. These ideas are tested with our fourth
hypothesis:
H4: Economically insecure individuals in the United States and Ca-
nada should oppose NAFTA, while those same individuals in Mexico
should support it.
Economic trade theories predict winners and losers, but they tend not
to take into account a variety of confounding factors. In particular, two
are important to note. First, economic liberalization involves adjustment
costs for some parts of every economy. Even if there are long-term gains
in store for those individuals, they may oppose neo-liberal policies myopi-
cally. Second, economic trade theories do not consider the influence of
targeted information on attitudes. The debate over NAIFTA was replete
with charged rhetoric in the United States and Canada, while Mexico was
relatively silent. Kollman (1998) argues that interest groups in the United
States specifically appealed to citizens ("outside lobbying") to arouse
popularity for their views on NAFTA and to create a critical mass with
which to influence legislators. These different information contexts must
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have had a significant impact on the development of opinions over the
regional trade agreement. In the following section, we describe the dif-
ferent contexts and draw up hypotheses regarding the influence of cues,
affinities, and stances on opinions over NAFTA.
III. INFORMATION EFFECTS AND PUBLIC OPINION
The information context that surrounds a policy decision can exert a
powerful influence on individuals' opinions over that policy (e.g., Zaller
1992; Kuklinski and Hurley 1994; Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit and Rich 2001).
At least two studies have used experimental designs to examine the per-
suasive ability of targeted information about NAFTA, and found positive
effects (Cobb and Kuklinski 1997; Aldrich, Merolla, Stephenson and
Zechmeister 2001). NAFTA provides a rich case in which to study the
effects of information contexts because of significant and interesting vari-
ance across the three countries. In this section, we briefly describe the
context in which NAFTA developed in each country with respect to pub-
lic debate and rhetoric. We use these descriptions to create a set of hy-
potheses concerning the non-economic determinants of public opinion
toward NAFTA across these three countries.
A. MEXICO
The information context in Mexico stands in sharp contrast to that of
Canada and the United States. While Mexico seemingly had the largest
short-term adjustment costs to face, public opposition to the agreement
was minimal. NAFTA was passed as a result of a tight coalition between
the government and big business that left the rest of Mexico in the dark.
In order to co-opt this crucial group, big business was allowed access to
the highest levels of negotiations, even to the point of sitting in a neigh-
boring hotel room during the tri-lateral conferences so that government
officials could slip out for quick consultations (Thacker 1999).
While the leftist opposition party, the PRD, and its leader, Cirdenas,
initially spoke out against the proposed agreement, they soon softened
their stance. The Zapatista uprising, timed to coincide with the signing of
NAFTA, also brought some attention to the possible drawbacks of
NAFTA. In general, though, there was not much organized opposition in
Mexico, particularly following the agreement's passage.
In an information-scarce environment, such as that which characterized
Mexico in this case, individuals must rely on actual experiences and cues
in order to form their opinions. As Wilson (2001) argues, the principal
cue-giver in Mexico is the president. The domineering and centralized
role of the president has traditionally placed him at the forefront of Mexi-
can politics. The president's message on NAFTA was clear. Both Salinas
and then Zedillo pursued free trade with vigor. Salinas launched a media
campaign to promote the benefits of NAFTA for Mexico, and comple-
mented it with a social investment fund program that distributed millions
of dollars in assistance to the rural communities most likely to be hit hard
2005]
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by the agreement. Wilson (2001) shows that, indeed, those more likely to
accept cues from the president (members of the PRI, those who liked the
president) were more likely to be in favor of NAFTA.
Unions were another likely source of cues and information in the Mexi-
can context. Under the PRI, unions were associated with big business
and government, both of which strongly supported NAFTA. NAFTA
was also predicted to benefit the manufacturing sector (Wilcox Young
1995). There was also likely to be some benefit, particularly over time, to
consumers (Lustig 1992; Baker 2003). Higher wages were also likely to
benefit urban workers. While unions did not conduct large campaigns
about NAFTA, individuals tied into their information networks, and
whose jobs may depend on toeing the union line, are likely to have re-
ceived a pro-NAFTA cue. In addition, those living in urban areas and/or
working in the manufacturing sector are likely to have had material in-
centives to accept pro-NAFTA cues and information.
Thus, the low-information context in Mexico and the domineering role
of the government and big business in the passage of NAFTA give us the
following hypotheses:
H5: In Mexico, those more likely to receive cues from the president
will support NAFTA, while those who resist such cues will oppose it.
H6: In Mexico, union members will support NAFTA. 2
B. THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, the debate over NAFTA was highly charged. The
anti-NAFTA coalition included the Citizen-Trade Campaign, composed
of 60 organizations ranging from labor unions, environmental and advo-
cacy groups, some agricultural groups, Jesse Jackson and some religious
and civic groups, the AFL-CIO, and Ross Perot (Avery 1998). The pro-
NAFTA coalition was slower in organizing than the opponents to the
agreement. For this reason, and because people tend to pay more atten-
tion to negative, threatening messages than positive ones (Cobb and Kuk-
linski 1997), the anti-NAFTA coalition's message resonated more loudly
and more frequently in public debate.
The U.S. debate over NAFTA focused on three central issues. The first
was whether NAFTA would create or destroy jobs. Ross Perot's com-
ments on this subject from the third presidential debate of 1992 are now
infamous:
Let's go to the center of the bull's eye-the core problem. And be-
lieve me, everybody on the factory floor all over the country knows
it. You implement NAFTA-the Mexican trade agreement where
they pay people $1 an hour, have no health care, no retirement, no
pollution control, etc., etc., etc.-and you are going to hear a giant
2. Primarily due to data limitations, we do not test hypotheses about the manufactur-
ing sector nor urban residence in this paper.
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sucking sound of jobs being pulled out of this country (cited in
Mayer 1998: 229).
Consistent with Perot's prediction, the AFL-CIO and the Economic
Policy Institute (EPI) claim that NAFTA has resulted in major job loss in
the U.S. According to a report by the EPI, between 1994 and 2000, the
growth in the net U.S. export deficit with Mexico and Canada has led to a
loss of 766,030 actual and potential U.S. jobs, hitting California, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Penn-
sylvania, Tennessee, and Texas the hardest, with more than 20,000 jobs
lost in each state (Scott, 2001). By 2002, the number of jobs lost reached
879,280 (Scott, 2003). The EPI also reports an increase in wage inequal-
ity, due to displaced workers obtaining new jobs with lower wages, a new
supply of workers in the service sector that has decreased wages in that
industry, and threats by companies to relocate their plants to Mexico in
bargaining disputes (Brofenbrenner 1997). While there were, and still
are, conflicting reports about the effects of NAFTA in the United States,
negative statistics about job loss were constantly invoked by NAFTA op-
ponents in their statements.
A second major issue was the environment. The concern was that, be-
cause Mexico was lax in its enforcement of environmental laws, NAFTA
would lead to further deterioration along the border. This issue was also
tied to concerns over jobs. Many believed Mexico's less strict environ-
mental laws would entice U.S. manufacturers to move south of the border
to save money on environmental cleanup. It should be noted, however,
that after 1991, many environmental groups switched sides after Bush
won their support through side deals in the fast track fight. Among these
groups were such influential organizations as the National Wildlife Feder-
ation, the Audubon Society, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the
Environmental Defense Fund, and the Nature Conservancy to the White
House (Mayer 1998).
The third issue was concern over flows of immigrants entering the
United States. Many economists and those in favor of NAFTA argued
that the agreement would have a positive effect on the Mexican economy,
and thus decrease the number of immigrants coming to the United States.
However, those opposed to NAFTA argued vociferously that lowering
immigration requirements would result in an influx of immigrants to the
country. Pat Buchanan, Ross Perot, and others frequently warned about
likely increases in the number of illegal immigrants coming from Mexico.
Related to this issue, we suspect that nationalism will be a key determi-
nant of attitudes toward NAFTA. Nationalist and xenophobic under-
tones marked much of the extreme, conservative anti-NAFTA rhetoric,
particularly those statements that focused on job loss and immigration.
While the debate over NAFTA touched on other issues, such as drug-
trafficking, the rhetoric was mainly comprised of these four issues.
In sum, because the information environment was so rich, individuals
in the United States should rely less on indirect cues and more on their
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feelings about jobs, the environment, immigrants, and nationalism in or-
der to construct their opinion over NAIFTA. Our precise hypotheses are
as follows:
H7: In the United States, individual stances on policies related to job
provision and protection will influence attitudes toward NAFTA.
H8: In the United States, individuals who are more in favor of the
environment will be more opposed to NAFTA, particularly in the
early days of the negotiations. In later years, this may reverse, due to a
change in the stances of important environmental groups.
H9: In the United States, individuals who are concerned about immi-
grants, or who have negative opinions about immigrants, will be more
opposed to NAFTA.
1110. In the United States, nationalism will be related to opposition to
NA FTA.
C. CANADA
In Canada, public opinion about NAFTA was largely shaped by the
debate that had surrounded the Canada-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment (CUFTA) just five years earlier. Prior to the implementation of
CUFTA, most Canadians were quite positive about the idea of free trade
with the U.S. 3 When attention turned to the specific agreement, how-
ever, opinion changed. The 1988 Canadian Federal Election was largely
fought over the issue of implementing CUFTA, and interests mobilized
on either side of the issue. The opposition group, Pro-Canada Network,
included the National Federation of Nurses Union, the Canadian Teach-
ers Federation, the Canadian Labour Congress, and the Canadian Auto
Workers, among others. Notable Canadian artists also joined the Council
of Canadians to signal their opposition to the agreement. The pro-
CUFTA forces included the Canadian Alliance for Trade and Job Oppor-
tunities (including the Canadian Manufacturer's Association and the Ca-
nadian Chamber of Commerce), the National Association of
Manufacturers, and the Canadian Exporters Association.
When NAFFA was negotiated, public debate was much less fierce, as
the agreement was essentially an extension of CUFTA to Mexico. While
their negative views of free trade can be traced to the poor economic
conditions of the early 1990s as much as to experience with CUFTA,
opinions about free trade were strongly influenced by what people per-
ceived to be the effects of CUFTA. 4 On average, Canadians felt that the
3. Clarke et al. (1996) show that between 1953 and 1988, more Canadians believed
that Canada would be better off if U.S. goods were allowed in the country without
tariff or customs charges, and vice versa for Canadian goods in the U.S.
4. Gaston and Trefler (1997) find that free trade itself can only account for 9-14% of
the 390,600 jobs lost between 1989 and 1992. They point, instead, to the recession,
the Bank of Canada's fight against inflation with high interest rates, deindustrial-
ization, deteriorating labor productivity, and rising labor costs. The coincident re-
cession in the United States also affected the performance of the economy, as
exports and imports decreased during the first years of trade.
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United States had benefited more from CUFTA. Specifically, rising un-
employment and job losses due to plant closures and relocations shaped
opinions about free trade with the United States. Campbell (2001) rein-
terprets Dungan and Murphy's (1999) data to show that there was a net
loss of 276,000 jobs in Canada between 1989 and 1997, not to mention the
amount of dislocation caused by restructuring.
Two main issues surrounded NAFTA in Canada. First, many Canadi-
ans were concerned with the social effects of NAFTA. There were fears
that lower wages and lower environmental standards in Mexico and the
United States would lure companies and jobs away from Canada. A sur-
vey of small manufacturing firms in 1990-91 revealed that 71.4% of the
Canadian companies surveyed believed NAFTA would cause job losses in
Canada (del Castillo 1995). Concerns about more job losses and restruc-
turing were closely tied to fears that the government would be limited in
its ability to structure welfare policy to help affected citizens (Jackson
1999). One of the top voiced concerns about NAFTA was the fate of
social programs, as the government would be faced with either lowering
taxes to attract investment and business or watching the economy dwin-
dle. Consequently, the government restructured its social programs, re-
sulting in the number of unemployed persons that collected benefits
dropping from 75 percent in 1990 to 36 percent in 2000.5 As a result,
protectionist feelings about the welfare state were and are linked to op-
position to NAFTA.
Second, Canadians were concerned that the agreement would be struc-
tured so as to provide maximum benefit to the United States. Jackson
(1999:94) reports that a major line of debate centered on whether the
agreement would do what it was designed to do - "secure access to the
U.S. market and protection for Canadian exports against recurrent U.S.
protectionism." These issues were related to feelings of Canadian pride
and independence. With the influx of goods from other countries, many
feared that Canadian identity would be compromised. Peter C. Newman
of Maclean's Magazine proclaimed in 1993,
If under the original Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) we
were limited to the influence of a mouse scratching the imperious
hide of an elephant, under NAFTA we are about to assume the clout
of a flea. The reason for this reduced status - and the comparison
may not hold because determined fleas make even big guys squirm -
is that the Mexican deal is only the first step in a set of alliances
being planned by Washington to transform the hemisphere into its
own giant day care center, with the kid-nations all dancing for the
Yankee dollar (Newman 1993:29).
Because of the heavy emphasis in Canada on fears of job losses, reduc-
tions in government provisions and welfare, and concerns about a loss of
autonomy, we draw the following hypotheses for the Canadian case:
5. Canadian Labour Congress (1999).
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1111: In Canada, individual stances on policies related to job provision
and protection will influence their attitudes toward NAFTA.
H12: In Canada, individuals who are more in favor of the welfare
state will be more opposed to NAFTA.
1113: In Canada, nationalism will be related to opposition to NAFTA.
IV. MODELS AND VARIABLES
One of the difficulties in testing hypotheses across two or more coun-
tries lies in the difficulty of finding comparable survey data. To test our
hypotheses, we use national surveys from each country. For the United
States and Mexico, we use the World Values Survey data for 1995. For
Canada, we use Canadian National Election Survey data from 1997. The
inconsistency in the timing of the surveys is regrettable. We think, how-
ever, that it poses a minimal number of problems. All three surveys were
administered well after the implementation of NAFTA. It is possible that
the later timing in Canada means that more effects were realized, or that
the salience of the issues had died down more than in the other two coun-
tries, and so some caution is appropriate when comparing the results
across the countries. More important, perhaps, is that while the Mexico
and United States questions ask about opinions toward NAFA, the
CNES surveys asks about trade with the United States. However, be-
cause Canadians associate NAFTA with trade with the United States and
vice versa, we do not think this is a significant problem.6 Thus, our de-
pendent variable in the case of Mexico and the United States asks, on a
one to four scale, how confident an individual is in NAFTA. In the case
of Canada, it asks, on the same scale, whether free trade with the United
States has been good for the Canadian economy. We take both these
questions as proxies for support or opposition to the policies of NAFTA.
The key independent variables fall into one of two categories: eco-
nomic factors, and cues, affinities, and stances. First, to test the H-O-S
model of factor endowments and the human capital model, we include
measures of education and income. Education is often employed to cap-
ture skill level, while income is also sometimes used to capture skill, par-
ticularly in association with the human capital model. We also include an
industrial/manual worker dummy variable to capture low-skilled or blue-
collar workers. To test the R-V model, we include a dummy variable for
6. The "hub and spoke" model of trade predicts that in a trade agreement such as
NAFTA, the primary beneficiary will be the middle partner, the "hub"; in this
case, the United States. Canada-Mexico trade was not expected to be substantially
affected by NAFTA, as it was a very small volume to begin with and the transpor-
tation difficulties of crossing the United States made trading with the other
"spoke" country much less attractive. Wonnacott (1996:65) argues that "[o]ne rea-
son why FTAs in an H&S [hub and spoke] configuration are worse than is often
recognized is that each spoke thinks it is participating in regional trade liberaliza-
tion-and it is, but only with the hub." Thus, the most significant part of NAFTA
for Canadians was not freer trade with Mexico, but changes to trading relations
with the United States.
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workers in the agricultural sector. Because farmers in all countries faced
significant adjustment costs, at least in the short-term, we hypothesize
that farmers will be opposed to NAFIA. Ideally, we would like to have
included more sectors, but we were unable to do so due to data limita-
tions. Finally, to test the impact of economic insecurity in general, we
include a variable that captures concerns about job security.7 In addition,
we include a variable measuring an individual's reported level of financial
satisfaction. We also include a variable for unemployment, although we
acknowledge that it is not necessarily the case that all unemployed per-
sons are economically insecure.
The second category of variables captures effects that are related to the
information context. The case of cues posed an interesting challenge.
Cues are verbal or non-verbal messages that convey information. Recep-
tion of cues depends on several factors that relate to the cue and the cue-
giver. Often it is hypothesized that people will respond to cues from indi-
viduals of whom they approve and toward whom they have warm feel-
ings. Wilson (2001), for example, shows that Mexicans who have more
positive evaluations of the president were more likely to support
NAFTA. Unfortunately, the World Values survey does not include simi-
lar questions to those used in that model, so we cannot replicate this anal-
ysis. However, another reason individuals accept cues may be more
psychological, having to do with personality types and, perhaps, culture.
Individuals who are more obedient, or who place a higher value on re-
spect for authority, should be more likely to accept the executive's policy
positions, particularly in a country where one individual or institution is
considered the supreme authority. Mexico, particularly pre-2000, is ex-
actly such a country. Therefore, to capture the tendency for individuals
to accept cues from the president, we use a variable that asks whether or
not respect for authority is an important value. The variable is coded so
that higher values indicate a greater preference for respect for authority
as a social value. Our variable relating to union membership, and links to
that information network, is more straightforward. It is a simple dummy
variable indicating whether or not the respondent is a member of a union.
For both the United States and Canada cases, concern over job losses
was very important. In addition, in Canada, there was a related, strongly
voiced concern about the welfare state and its possible dismantlement in
light of NAFTA. Unfortunately, we lack questions about beliefs about
what will happen or had happened to jobs under NAFTA. Instead, we
7. The Canadian dataset presented a slight problem due to the fact that unemployed
individuals were not asked the job security question. Rather than drop these re-
spondents or this variable, we imputed values for these individuals by cross-tab-
bing the unemployed variable with a prospective individual assessment variable.
The job security variable runs from 0 to 4, with 4 being most worried. We coded
those who were unemployed and gave a negative future projection as 3, those who
were unemployed and said things were likely to continue the same as 2, and those
who were unemployed and gave a positive projection as 1. If we run the model
without either of these variables (unemployed or job security) the other results
remain the same.
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include a question that measures whether an individual believes the gov-
ernment should provide a decent standard of living to all or should allow
individuals to get ahead on their own. The variable is measured on a ten-
point scale in Mexico and the United States, is a dummy variable in Ca-
nada, and is coded such that higher values indicate more support for gov-
ernment responsibility. We believe this variable is a good measure of a
defensive posture toward the welfare state and therefore is most likely to
be significant in Canada.
To capture feelings toward the environment, we use a variable that asks
individuals whether protecting the environment is important, even if it
risks jobs. The variable is coded so that a higher value indicates a greater
preference for protecting the environment. Because immigration was a
significant issue in the United States, we include a question that asks
whether there should be restrictions on immigrants working in Mexico
and the United States, and a question that asks about increasing or de-
creasing the number of immigrants admitted into Canada. The variable is
coded so that higher values indicate greater preference for restrictions, in
the case of Mexico and the United States. The coding is the reverse for
the case of Canada.
We also include a nationalism question that asks how much pride, in
the case of Mexico and the United States, or how warmly, in Canada, the
individual feels toward his or her country: It is coded so that higher val-
ues indicate higher levels of nationalism. In some ways, this variable is
related to concern over jobs in the United States and Canada, as the rhet-
oric always referred to jobs moving to another country. We believe the
immigration question likely also taps into nationalism, particularly of a
xenophobic nature. Finally, we include regional dummy variables for
each country in order to control for the different or perceived impacts of
NAFTA in each region.
We test the model using OLS regression. Because the dependent varia-
ble only contains four discrete outcomes, we certainly violate the assump-
tion that the dependent variable is continuous and unbounded. To test
whether this creates problems for the analysis, we also ran the model for
each country using ordered probit analysis. The results were nearly iden-
tical. Because of the relative ease of interpreting OLS coefficients as op-
posed to ordered probit coefficients, we present the results of the OLS
analysis here.
Before turning to our results, we should note that the survey data we
use was compiled a few years after the NAFTA debate. We chose this
timing because we wanted to test our economic hypotheses at a point
when real effects could have been felt. One might be concerned that this
could impact the salience and importance of the cues discussed above.
But as our results will show, the non-economic interests remain signifi-
cant influences on NAFTA opinions. There are at least two possible ex-
planations for this. First, trade as a policy issue did not cease to be
important after NAFTA was signed. The fast-track debates in the United
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States, for example, kept the issue fresh in people's minds. Second,
NAFTA scheduled tariff reductions to take place over several years. As
each industry felt the impact of lower tariffs, negative consequences of
the agreement were publicized by the media and thus remained
significant.
V. RESULTS
Table 1 (infra) shows the results of the OLS regressions on the models
for each country. Turning first to the economic variables, we find some
confirmation for each of our economic hypotheses. Education is signifi-
cant only in the case of the United States, and in the expected direction.
In Canada, income is significant, and also in the correct direction. These
results indicate that in both developed countries, more skilled individuals
support NAFTA, while less skilled individuals oppose the agreement. In
the United States, the industrial/manual worker variable is also signifi-
cant and negative, providing additional support for these hypotheses. In
Mexico, none of these variables are significant. While Canada and the
United States provide evidence for both the H-O-S and the human capi-
tal models, the models are ineffectual in predicting support for NAFTA
in Mexico.
In all three countries, we find support for the R-V model. In each case,
the dummy variable indicating membership in the agricultural sector is
significant. In Mexico, however, it should be noted that we distinguished
between farmers and agricultural workers and the latter was not
significant.
Finally, as expected, we find some interesting cross-national differences
in our economic insecurity variables. Earlier we had hypothesized that
the job security variable would be positive for Mexico and negative for
the United States and Canada. Our results confirm this hypothesis,
though the variable is in the correct direction but not quite significant for
the United States. Interestingly, Mexico differs from the other two coun-
tries only on this one indicator of economic insecurity. With respect to
financial satisfaction and unemployment, although not significant, the
signs on the coefficients are in the same direction in Mexico as they were
predicted to be in the other two countries. In other words, in Mexico,
unemployed individuals and those who are less satisfied with their eco-
nomic situation are less in favor of the agreement, but those who are
insecure support NAFTA. We believe this is because of the increased job
prospects offered by NAFTA in Mexico. Supporting this hypothesis, a
series of focus groups conducted by our research group in Mexico found
that people frequently credited NAFTA for bringing better paying and
higher quality jobs to Mexico.
Turning to the non-economic variables, we find clear support for nearly
all of our hypotheses. As can be seen from the table, in Mexico, it is
one's access to and tendency to receive cues that are the key non-eco-
nomic determinants of public opinion in our model, in addition to feel-
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ings toward immigrants. With respect to the former variables, we find
that union members are more supportive of NAFTA. As we said before,
because of the corporatist nature of the Mexican state and the conse-
quent close relationship between unions, big business and the state, we
expected to find that union members would express preferences in accord
with these two domineering entities. We also find significant support for
our hypothesis that those who value respect for authority received and
accepted the cues offered by the supreme authority in the nation, the
president: those who report valuing respect for authority are more sup-
portive of NAFTA than those who do not.
In Mexico, it is interesting that the immigration variable is significant
because, clearly, Mexicans did not fear a large influx of Canadians or U.S.
citizens looking for jobs as a result of NAFTA.8 However, they did resent
the relocation of foreign-owned mega-businesses, such as Wal-mart, to
Mexico. This attitude was frequently expressed in the focus groups con-
ducted by our research group, referred to above. In addition, this varia-
ble likely captures a type of nationalism. Morris (1999) argues that
nationalism in Mexico has two components, one that reflects a basic pride
in Mexico and the other that contains elements of xenophobia or dislike
of other countries, particularly the United States. It is possible that our
immigrant variable taps into this latter type of nationalism and is signifi-
cant in Mexico for that reason.
Our hypotheses are also well supported for the case of the United
States. The immigration variable, as well as the nationalism variable, is
significant. As we noted, rhetoric in the United States dealt heavily with
the topic of immigrants and was colored by nationalist and often xeno-
phobic undertones. Interestingly, the sign on the coefficient for the envi-
ronment variable is positive. This result reflects the fact that the major
environmental groups, vhile initially opposed, had swung their support
behind NAFTA in the early 1990s, and further suggests that the majority
of the public takes cues from these mainstream and centrist environmen-
tal groups rather than more extreme organizations.
In alternative models, we used the American NES election studies
from 1992, 1996, and 2000 to determine influences on general trade pref-
erences. We found, in line with our WV data results, that those who sym-
pathized with environmentalists were more likely to favor trade in 1996
and 2000. In 1992, however, when the rhetoric was strongest, and the
major environmental groups had just recently changed sides of the de-
bate, pro-environmentalists were still opposed to free trade. Union mem-
bership is not a significant predictor of support for NAFTA in the United
8. Mexico has received a large number of immigrants from Central America, particu-
larly from Guatemala. These immigrants are typically unskilled workers seeking
jobs in relatively advantaged Mexico. Therefore, the immigration variable may be
tapping xenophobia, or real economic threats from an influx of unskilled workers
that would compete with Mexican labor. While perhaps not directly related to
NAFTA, these immigrants may be perceived to be part of the macro economic
shifts related to NAFTA.
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States in our data. Our alternative runs with the NES data found the
same result, but showed that feelings toward unions were an important
influence on trade opinions. It appears, then, that the rhetoric publicized
by unions reached a larger audience than only union members.
In Canada, once again, our information-context hypotheses receive a
good amount of support. In Canada, environmentalists and union mem-
bers are opposed to NAFTA, which is consistent with the policy stances
taken by leading environmental and union organizations. Interestingly,
the respect for authority variable is significant in Canada. Those who
value obedience to authority are more likely to accept the government
position than others. It is interesting that the magnitude of the variable is
actually larger in Canada than in Mexico (not only is the coefficient
slightly larger, but in the case of Mexico the variable is trichotomous,
whereas in the Canadian case it has four outcomes). This is particularly
interesting because it is less clear who the lead cue-giver is in the Cana-
dian political system. Still, given that free trade was no longer a pertinent
issue in 1997, and that the major political parties supported NAFTA as
early as 1993, it seems likely that those who believe that "government
knows best" would be in support of free trade with the United States.
Most important for the case of Canada is that the variable asking about
the government's responsibility for a decent standard of living is signifi-
cant and in the correct direction. As we hypothesized, Canadians that
have a strong preference for the welfare state are likely to oppose
NAFTA. The focus on this issue in the debate over NAFTA strongly
linked it to opinions over the agreement. Finally, it is interesting to note
that the immigration variable is nearly significant in Canada. Because it
is coded opposite to the variable in the other two countries, the positive
sign means that it has a similar effect-people who are less tolerant of
immigrants are less supportive of NAFTA. As with Mexico, we believe
this variable captures some of the anti-U.S. feelings that were salient in
the NAFTA debates and rhetoric. While the nationalism variable is insig-
nificant in Canada, we tried an alternative specification of the model us-
ing a U.S. feeling thermometer as a sign of "anti-U.S." nationalism. This
variable was significant and in the correct direction - individuals who felt
warmly toward the United States were more likely to favor free trade.
This corresponds with our hypotheses and the interpretation of the re-
sults presented here.
VI. ECONOMIC VERSUS INFORMATIONAL INFLUENCES
At this point, we have not yet focused on the magnitude of the coeffi-
cients. In this section, we examine the substantive effect of the coeffi-
cients and, at the same time, consider the extent to which the economic
and context-driven variables mitigate or trump each other's effects. Our
primary interest is whether there is evidence that the context-driven vari-
ables cause people to adopt policy preferences that conflict with their ec-
onomic interests.
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We first note the substantive effects of the key variables for each
model. In the case of Mexico, the impact of the economic variables is
moderate. The financial satisfaction variable ranges across a ten-point
scale, and moving from one end to the other changes the value of the
dependent variable by a little less than 1/4 of a unit. The farmer dummy
variable has a similar effect across its range. The impact of the job secur-
ity variable is slightly less than the other two, as moving across the range
of this variable changes confidence in NAFTA by roughly 1/5 of a unit.
With respect to the context-driven variables, the coefficient on the union
membership variable is not very large. The substantive impact of the re-
spect for authority variable is slightly larger. The largest effect, however,
comes from the immigration variable. When moved across its four-point
range, this variable changes the dependent variable by well over half a
unit.
In the case of the United States, the unemployed and industrial/manual
worker dummy variables have a slight to moderate impact, whereas the
substantive importance of the farmer dummy variable is nearly twice as
large, at 4/10 of a unit. The impact of education is slightly greater across
its twenty-point range. The environment policy variable, a dummy varia-
ble, has only a very slight impact. Nationalism and the immigration vari-
ables, on the other hand, have a fairly large impact, each exerting an
influence of more than half a unit over their ranges.
Finally, turning to Canada, income has a moderate effect across its ten-
point range, 1/3 of a unit, and the impact of financial satisfaction across its
five-point range is just slightly less. The coefficient on the farmer dummy
variable is also of moderate size. The job security variable, which ranges
across five values, exerts a similar effect across its range. Of the context-
driven variables, it is the respect for authority variable that, interestingly,
has the largest effect, changing the dependent variable by nearly half a
unit across its range. The union membership variable exerts a slight nega-
tive impact on the dependent variable. The environment variable, across
its four-point range, and the government responsibility variable, across its
one-point range, exert moderate influences.
In the introduction to this paper, we posed the question of whether or
not non-economic influences might work to diminish economic influ-
ences, such that individuals are persuaded to act against their personal
economic interests. Each of the models suggest that this can and does
happen. Consider, for example, the case of farm workers in Mexico.
Their location in a sector that is subject to significant short-term adjust-
ment costs in each country and the dislocations and insecurities that are
associated with it suggests that it is in their interest to have negative opin-
ions toward NAFTA. The sign on the coefficient shows that the direct
effect of this variable in each country matches this expectation, as we
have already noted. Comparing the substantive effects of both the
farmer dummy and the respect for authority variable, however, it can be
seen that the respect for authority variable, when moved across its range,
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cancels out and slightly overrides the impact of the farmer variable.
Farmers who show a tendency to be more obedient to authority are
slightly more likely to support NAFTA than the mean respondent. In
contrast, those who do not value respect for authority hold views that
reinforce their economic interests. If most farmers in Mexico tended not
to value authority, which, in our analysis, leads them to accept the
NAFTA cue from the executive, there would be no problem. But over
half the farmers in our sample reported the highest possible value for the
authority variable.
Turning to the U.S. case, it is interesting to examine the joint impact of
education and nationalism. As we have noted, more educated people in
the United States should support NAFTA, and free trade in general, be-
cause they have the most to gain. Once again, the direct effect of the
education variable supports this hypothesis. But the more nationalist one
is, the less likely he/she is to support NAFTA. Because nationalism has a
more substantial effect across its range than education, our model shows
that highly educated people who are also very nationalistic are less likely
to support NAFTA than the average individual, ceteris paribus. As it
turns out, however, a very low percentage of those with the highest level
of education in our sample are also extremely nationalistic, so this situa-
tion does not often arise. The same occurs with the immigration variable.
It exerts an effect capable of negating the positive effect of high educa-
tion on support for NAFTA, but only roughly 4 percent of highly edu-
cated people in the United States also express a preference for the
highest value on the immigrant variable (prohibiting all immigrants).
However, slightly less than half of the respondents indicate a preference
for some restrictions, which, compared to an open-door attitude, still
cancels out the effect of education.
We see similar effects in Canada. Taking job security as an example
this time, we see that those who are more concerned about their jobs and
job security are less likely to endorse free trade. The variable ranges
across five points, and its substantive impact across its range is roughly 1/
3 of a unit. As noted earlier, respect for authority exerts an impact of
more than 1/2 a unit across its range. Consequently, people who are eco-
nomically insecure but hold great respect for authority are more than per-
suaded to go against their apparent economic interests. A little over 1/3
of the most economically insecure respondents indicate a strong respect
for authority.
Of course, not all context-driven variables exert influences that are jux-
taposed with the direction of the economic variables. Often, cues, affini-
ties, and stances exert influences that reinforce economic interests. For
example, sticking with the case of Canada, a person who is concerned
about his or her job security, and who is also in favor of the environment
and the welfare state, is pushed even further in opposition to free trade
by these latter two variables. The same is true for the combination of low
skilled or industrial/manual workers in the United States, and those who
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Mexico United States Canada
B s.e. B s.e. B s.e.
0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.02) 0.02* (0.01)
-0.02 (0.07) -0.12 (0.11) -0.14* (0.06)
0.17* (0.07) -0.06* (0.03) -0.02 (0.07)
0.01 (0.02) 0.03* (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)
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0.09* (0.05) 0.10* (0.04) -0.02 (0.06)
0.01 (0.01) -0.26* (0.07) -0.01 (0.01)




































In Canada, the dependent variable asked if free trade with the United States was good for the
country. In Mexico and the United States, the dependent variable asked how much confidence
the respondent had in NAFTA. Because Canadians view NAFTA as an extension of CUFTA,
and have very few trade relations with Mexico, this question is a decent measurement of feelings
toward NAFTA.
6 The World Values asks respondents at what age they did or will finish their full-time schooling.
We excluded any respondents answering over 30 years of age so as to not bias the variable.
In Mexico, there is a difference between farmers (owners) and agricultural workers, so we
separated the two occupations. There was no difference in the other two countries, so we report
the disaggregated results for Mexico only.
i In Canada, this question asked if Canada should admit more immigrants. The variable is coded
1 for more, 0 for the same, and -1 for fewer. In Mexico and the United States, this question
asked about allowing immigrants to work in the country, ranging from 1 to 4, with 4 being the
most conservative.
are unemployed, and the nationalism and immigration variables. And in
Mexico, farmers who express xenophobic attitudes by expressing a pref-
GLOBALIZATION
erence for restrictions on immigrants have their economic interests rein-
forced and bolstered by these beliefs. What is interesting to note,
however, is that it is possible for information targeted to the public by
interest groups and elites to sometimes compete with economic interests.
VII. CONCLUSION
The study of public opinion toward regional integration and free trade
has become very popular in recent years. Economic trade theory has,
and will continue, to structure such research. The type of results we have
presented here, however, suggest that scholars will be unable to fully un-
derstand the roots of public opinion until they delve into the popular is-
sues that surround the debate about trade.
We find that both economic and context-driven factors influence opin-
ion toward free trade, with the latter sometimes outweighing the influ-
ence of the former. It is particularly interesting to us that these non-
economic factors are still significant with the data that we use, from
surveys conducted several years after the debates. When trade is its most
salient and the rhetoric strongest, such as before a policy has had time to
affect an economy, one would expect any number of factors to influence
policy preferences. When the actual effects of an agreement become
known, however, and people realize whether they are a winner or loser, it
is interesting that non-economic factors still hold sway. As we noted ear-
lier, it is possible that the debate was kept alive by some interest groups,
perhaps particularly in the United States, but this does not adequately
explain the strong, lasting impact of the informational context across all
three countries.
Our results indicate that it is possible for non-economic factors to
counteract the effects of economic interests on preferences. Individuals
who form opinions contrary to their expected economic interest, how-
ever, are not necessarily behaving irrationally. There are several reasons
why cues, affinities, and stances may exert a more powerful influence on
trade preferences. First, a majority of individuals in a country will be
personally unaffected by trade agreements. Trade produces diffuse bene-
fits, in the form of lower cost goods and prosperous economies, and con-
centrated costs, in the form of job losses or restructuring. Unless
individuals feel the costs of trade directly, it is quite possible that they
have only non-economic cues to turn to when forming opinions. Second,
many individuals develop preferences based upon sociotropic concerns
(Kramer 1983; Kinder, Adams and Gronke 1989; MacKuen, Erikson, and
Stimson 1992; McGraw, Best and Timpone 1995). Even if one is not di-
rectly affected, reports of the consequences of a trade agreement, espe-
cially if they correspond to the rhetoric that circulated, can convince
individuals that trade is not best for the country as a whole. Third, the
opponents to free trade are often better organized than the supportive
forces and use more persuasive media to shape public opinion. In the
case of NAFTA, the anti-NAFTA forces used strong, negative images to
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influence the public-characteristics that tend to stick out in a person's
mind when forming opinions about trade (Cobb and Kuklinski 1997).
In sum, this paper shows that popular rhetoric is an important and sig-
nificant player in free trade debates, and that it significantly influences
attitudes. While our results show that non-economic influences have last-
ing effects, we do not know how long such considerations will remain
significant predictors of NAFTA support, or how they will compete with
long-term economic effects.
The findings in this paper have potentially important implications for
the future of integration in North America. That support for free trade is
not simply a function of the expected material costs and benefits of such
policies makes predicting support for future integration considerably
more difficult. On the one hand, elite support for further integration has
the potential to persuade those likely to experience losses by framing the
debate in a way that is more palatable. On the other hand, even if widen-
ing the scope of integration in North America produces benefits for a
majority of citizens, elite dissenters have the ability to mobilize anti-inte-
gration sentiment by focusing the debate on the less popular conse-
quences of integration.
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